Архаров Г.Ю. Отзыв лицензии или санация: критерии выбора и роль системной значимости

Научная статья
УДК 336.71
https://doi.org/10.24158/tipor.2026.6.16
 
Отзыв лицензии или санация:
критерии выбора и роль системной значимости
 
Григорий Юрьевич Архаров
Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации, Москва, Россия,
grisha20082002@mail.ru, https://orcid.org/0009-0004-3346-4140
 
Аннотация. Статья посвящена выбору регулятора между отзывом лицензии и санацией кредитной организации. При формализованной методике отнесения банка к системно значимым решение о судьбе проблемного банка остается нормативно неурегулированным и на практике определяется его системной значимостью. Проанализированы режимы урегулирования несостоятельности банков в США, Евросоюзе, Великобритании и Швейцарии, в результате чего выявлено несовершенство российской модели, опирающейся на средства регулятора, по сравнению с зарубежным переходом к списанию обязательств за счет инвесторов банка.
Ключевые слова: отзыв лицензии, санация, финансовое оздоровление, системно значимые кредитные организации, ФКБС, «too big to fail», «bail-in»
Финансирование: инициативная работа.
Для цитирования: Архаров Г.Ю. Отзыв лицензии или санация: критерии выбора и роль системной значимости // Теория и практика общественного развития. 2026. № 6. C. 146–152. https://doi.org/10.24158/tipor.2026.6.16.
 
Original article
 
License Revocation or Rehabilitation:
Selection Criteria and the Role of Systemic Importance
 
Grigory Yu. Arkharov
Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia,
grisha20082002@mail.ru, https://orcid.org/0009-0004-3346-4140
 
Abstract. The article is devoted to the choice of the regulator between revocation of the license and rehabilitation of the credit organization. With the formalized method of classifying a bank as systemically significant, the decision on the fate of a problem bank remains unregulated according to the standards, and in practice, it is determined by its systemic significance. The regimes for regulating the non-functioning of the banks in the USA, the European Union, Great Britain, and Switzerland are analyzed, with the consequence that the Russian model, based on the regulator’s funds in comparison with the foreign transition to writing off the obligations at the expense of the bank’s investors, is imperfect.
Keywords: license revocation, rehabilitation, financial recovery, systemically important credit organizations, BSCF, too big to fail, bail-in
Funding: Independent work.
For citation: Arkharov, G.Yu. (2026) License Revocation or Rehabilitation: Selection Criteria and the Role of Systemic Importance. Theory and Practice of Social Development. (6), 146–152. Available from: doi:10.24158/tipor.2026.6.16 (In Russian).
 
© Архаров Г.Ю., 2026

Список источников:
 
Архаров Г.Ю. Идентификация проблемных банков в России: диагностика и надзорный мониторинг // Теория и практика общественного развития. 2026. № 5. С. 242–248. https://doi.org/10.24158/tipor.2026.5.27.
Гумеров М.Ф., Ризванова И.А. Кредитные риски российских коммерческих банков: новые подходы к управлению // Финансы: теория и практика. 2023. Т. 27. № 2. С. 64–75.
Конвисарова Е.В., Левченко Т.А. Проблемы и совершенствование развития банков с государственным участием в России // Фундаментальные исследования. 2024. № 12. С. 38–43. https://doi.org/10.17513/fr.43737.
Arner D.W., Avgouleas E., Gibson E.C. COVID19, Macroeconomic and Sustainability Shocks, Moral Hazard and Resolution of Systemic Banking Crises: Designing Appropriate Systems of Public Support // European Business Organization Law Review. 2022. Vol. 23. No. 4. P. 937–976. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-022-00255-1.
Cuadros-Solas P.J., Salvador C., Suárez N. Am I Riskier if I Rescue My Banks? Beyond the Effects of Bailouts // Journal of Financial Stability. 2021. Vol. 56. Art. 100935. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2021.100935.
Cutura J.A. Debt Holder Monitoring and Implicit Guarantees: Did the BRRD Improve Market Discipline? // Journal of Financial Stability. 2021. Vol. 54. Art. 100879. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2021.100879.
Hahn S., Momtaz P.P., Wieandt A. The Economics of Banking Regulation in Europe: Does the Post-GFC Bail-in Regime Effectively Eliminate Implicit Government Guarantees? // The European Journal of Finance. 2023. Vol. 29. No. 7. P. 700–725. https://doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2022.2058882.
Hryckiewicz A., Kryg N., Tsomocos D.P. Bank Resolution Mechanisms Revisited: Towards a New Era of Restructuring // Journal of Financial Stability. 2023. Vol. 67. Art. 101158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2023.101158.
Lamers M., Present T., Soenen N., Vander Vennet R. Does BRRD Mitigate the Bank-to-Sovereign Risk Channel? // PLoS ONE. 2024. Vol. 19. No. 4. Art. e0292040. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0292040.
Shikha N., Kapsis I. Bank Crisis Management and Resolution after SVB and Credit Suisse: Perspectives from India and the European Union // International Insolvency Review. 2024. Vol. 33. No. 1. P. 55–88. https://doi.org/10.1002/iir.1516.
 
References:
 
Arkharov, G.Yu. (2026) Identification of Problem Banks in Russia: Diagnostics and Supervisory Monitoring. Theory and Practice of Social Development. No. 5. Pp. 242–248. (In Russian), Available from: doi: https://doi.org/10.24158/tipor.2026.5.27.
Arner, D.W., Avgouleas, E. and Gibson, E.C. (2022) COVID19, Macroeconomic and Sustainability Shocks, Moral Hazard and Resolution of Systemic Banking Crises: Designing Appropriate Systems of Public Support. European Business Organization Law Review. Vol. 23. No. 4. Pp. 937–976. Available from: doi:10.1007/s40804-022-00255-1.
Cuadros-Solas, P.J., Salvador, C. and Suárez, N. (2021) Am I Riskier if I Rescue My Banks? Beyond the Effects of Bailouts. Journal of Financial Stability. Vol. 56. Art. 100935. Available from: doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2021.100935.
Cutura, J.A. (2021) Debt Holder Monitoring and Implicit Guarantees: Did the BRRD Improve Market Discipline? Journal of Financial Stability. Vol. 54. Art. 100879. Available from: doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2021.100879.
Gumerov, M.F. and Rizvanova, I.A. (2023) Credit Risks of Russian Commercial Banks: New Approaches to Management. Finance: Theory and Practice. Vol. 27. No. 2. Pp. 64–75. (In Russian)
Hahn, S., Momtaz, P.P. and Wieandt, A. (2023) The Economics of Banking Regulation in Europe: Does the Post-GFC Bail-in Regime Effectively Eliminate Implicit Government Guarantees? The European Journal of Finance. Vol. 29. No. 7. Pp. 700–725. Available from: doi:10.1080/1351847X.2022.2058882.
Hryckiewicz, A., Kryg, N. and Tsomocos, D.P. (2023) Bank Resolution Mechanisms Revisited: Towards a New Era of Restructuring. Journal of Financial Stability. Vol. 67. Art. 101158. Available from: doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2023.101158.
Konvisarova, E.V. and Levchenko, T.A. (2024) Problems and Improvement of Development of State-Owned Banks in Russia. Fundamental’nye Issledovaniya. No. 12. Pp. 38–43. Available from: doi:10.17513/fr.43737. (In Russian)
Lamers, M., Present, T., Soenen, N. and Vander Vennet, R. (2024) Does BRRD Mitigate the Bank-to-Sovereign Risk Channel? PLoS ONE. Vol. 19. No. 4. Art. e0292040. Available from: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0292040.
Shikha, N. and Kapsis, I. (2024) Bank Crisis Management and Resolution after SVB and Credit Suisse: Perspectives from India and the European Union. International Insolvency Review. Vol. 33. No. 1. Pp. 55–88. Available from: doi:10.1002/iir.1516.